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A B S T R A C T
In this article we examine the emerging party systems of the devolved
environments, with an eye toward shedding light on the factors that
influence the number of parties in a system where parties are already
mobilized but the institutional context is new. Our findings demonstrate
that electoral rules have an independent effect on the number of parties.
More specifically, the use of proportional representation has increased
the number of parties. In addition, two social cleavage structure factors
appear to affect the design of the party system: class and center–
periphery. All of these forces lead to a more complex governing arrange-
ment in the devolved settings than that of the United Kingdom.
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Introduction
The end of the twentieth century marked a shift in the political structure of
the United Kingdom (UK). In the summer of 1999, the Scottish Parliament
convened for the first time in nearly 300 years, while similar institutions
opened in Wales and Northern Ireland. While emanating from Westminster,
the devolved institutions varied a great deal from both the British model of
parliament as well as from one another, though all three continued to
remain subject, to varying extents, to the functioning of the British system.
The advent of sub-national government in the UK offers numerous oppor-
tunities for studying the effects of varying types of institutions, the expan-
sion of issue agendas and the dynamics of multi-level governance. In this
article, we compare and contrast the emerging party systems of the devolved
environments with those at the national level, with an eye toward shedding
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light on the factors that influence the number of parties in a system and the
effects of the party system on the cabinet level. While these systems are not
‘new’ in the sense of newly democratized countries, they offer insight into
the effects of a new context and rules in an existing democracy.
The distinctions between the national and sub-national levels of the UK
offer an unusual opportunity for a quasi-experimental examination of the
factors that influence the formation and effects of party systems. While
British parliamentary elections are conducted using plurality electoral laws,
the devolved systems deviate from this pattern, using mixed-member
proportional (MMP) representation in Scotland and Wales and the single-
transferable vote (STV) in Northern Ireland. Moreover, the devolved
settings offer a contrast in the types of party systems and various cleavage
structures. This begs the question of whether the distinct party systems at
the sub-national level are a result of the changes in electoral laws or differ-
ent cleavage patterns operating at the sub-national level. While the debate
over the relative impact of electoral laws versus social cleavages on party
systems is nothing new, the devolved systems shed new light on this old
controversy. It is to this controversy that we now turn.
Party System Determinants and Party System Change
As important linkage institutions, political parties and party systems and
the factors that influence their development and operation have received a
wealth of attention from scholars (for a review, see Lijphart, 1994a).
Existing empirical and theoretical work concentrates primarily on the role
of two factors – electoral rules and social cleavages – in shaping the forma-
tion and structure of party systems. Although these two factors dominate
the discussion of party system determinants, they are rarely accorded equal
weight by the same author. In essence, these two factors represent separate
paradigms competing to explain both the formation and continuity of party
systems in advanced industrial democracies. As is shown below, separately
neither explanation is wholly satisfactory in explaining either the develop-
ment or the continuity of party systems.
Electoral Rules, Cleavage Patterns and Party Systems
The lineage of electoral rules as instrumental in determining party system
attributes can be traced back at least to F. A. Hermens (1941), who claimed
that proportional representation (PR) led to a proliferation of political
parties, unstable government and political extremism. Based on his analysis
of the adoption of PR in Weimar Germany and Italy, he argued that the
permissive nature of such electoral rules dispersed power and allowed
extremist Nazi and fascist groups to gain representation in parliament and
eventually take control of both governments.
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Similarly, Maurice Duverger (1954) posited that electoral laws are an
essential component in party system formation. According to his theory,
plurality electoral laws lead to two-party systems and political stability
through single-party majority governments (Duverger’s Law), whereas PR
causes fragmentation of parties and results in unstable coalition govern-
ments (Duverger’s hypothesis). Despite some exceptions (notably, Canada
at the national level), Duverger’s argument essentially states that electoral
rules play a dominant role in shaping the party system and has received both
a great deal of support (Riker, 1982; Sartori, 1994; Taagepera and Shugart,
1989) and criticism (Blondel, 1972; Lipson, 1959).
The most comprehensive theoretical challenge to the impact of electoral
systems on party systems was issued by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan
(1967), who argued that cleavage structures were responsible for party
system characteristics. Lipset and Rokkan posited that deep-seated
cleavages determined the balance of power in the political system. Electoral
rules emerged as a result of the underlying cleavages and power distri-
butions. Hence, party system characteristics were determined by the under-
lying cleavage structures; electoral rules simply mirrored such cleavages. In
what has come to be known as the ‘frozen party thesis’, Lipset and Rokkan
go on to argue that as industrialization became firmly implanted through
near universal suffrage, Western party systems were in effect ‘frozen’ along
the cleavage structures in place in the early part of the twentieth century.
This thesis is echoed in Luebbert’s (1991) explanation of regime types of
interwar Europe.
Lipset and Rokkan attribute these cleavage structures to two major
revolutions in Western Europe: the National Revolution and the Industrial
Revolution. The former concerned the rise of the nation-state and the
process of nation-building. As this process progressed, two primary
cleavages – center versus periphery and Church versus state – emerged.
During the latter revolution, two additional cleavages – landed interests
versus industrialists and workers versus owners – became relevant as well
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). With some relatively minor exceptions, Lipset
and Rokkan argued that since the advent of universal or near universal
suffrage at the beginning of the twentieth century no fundamental shifts had
occurred in the party systems of Western Europe, and hence party systems
in the 1960s looked remarkably similar to those found in the 1920s.1
More recent work has challenged the social determinism school and
found it lacking; party systems have experienced changes which Lipset and
Rokkan ruled out (Shamir, 1984). As a result, theoretical work has come
full circle, and once again points to the importance of electoral laws in
shaping party system characteristics. The resurgence of interest in political
institutions, dubbed the ‘New Institutionalism’ (March and Olsen, 1984),
has been at the forefront of renewed interest in the consequences of electoral
laws. Building from Rae’s (1967) seminal work finding that district magni-
tude was critical in determining the effective number of parties and level of
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fractionalization in a system, scholars have attempted to refine the relation-
ship between electoral laws and party systems.
Increases in data availability have led to more cross-national comparisons
of the effects of electoral rules on parties and party systems. Taagepera and
Shugart (1989) offer impressive statistical evidence that district magnitude
plays an important part in determining vote to seat disproportionality. In
addition, they point out a statistical relationship between high district
magnitudes and greater numbers of effective parties. Similarly, Lijphart
(1994) finds that electoral systems play a key role in shaping party systems.
‘Thawed’ Party Systems?
More than three decades have passed since Lipset and Rokkan’s assertion
of frozen party systems, and since that time a great deal of attention has
been placed on the entry of new parties into the electoral arena. Much of
the evidence of party system change is centered around the work of Mogens
Pedersen’s (1979) seminal article on patterns of electoral volatility in post-
war European democracies. This article introduced the Pedersen index of
volatility, a measure now widely used as an indicator of shifts in party
support among the electorate (see Mair, 1997). Using this index, a trend
toward increasingly volatile electorates has emerged.
Aggregate level studies have revealed some interesting and at times
contradictory results. In general, findings show that party systems are
becoming more fluid and that European electorates are becoming more
volatile and display less loyalty to parties than in the past (see Ersson and
Lane, 1998; Pedersen, 1979; Shamir, 1984). In particular, studies of voter
volatility have shown steady increases across the European electorates
(Bohrer and Tan, 2000). As Ersson and Lane (1998: 35) note, ‘[t]he evidence
from several sources is that electoral instability is up in the late twentieth
century in Western Europe. The voters are no longer frozen in established
commitments toward political parties’.
Along the same lines, there has been some progress in reconciling the
electoral laws versus societal cleavages arguments among scholars of party
systems. Bartolini and Mair (1990) argue that effects of the electoral system
and social cleavages both play a role in determining the shape of a country’s
party system. Similarly, Gary Cox (1997) concludes, as do Ordeshook and
Shvetsova (1994), that the effective number of political parties is dependent
on both the level of social heterogeneity and the electoral rules in place. As
Cox (1997: 221) puts it, ‘a polity can tend toward bipartism either because
it has a strong electoral system or because it has few cleavages. Multipartism
arises as the joint product of many exploitable cleavages and a permissive
electoral system’.
While there is little doubt of increasing fluctuations in voting patterns
across Western Europe, there is no consensus on the extent of this change.
Scholars who have taken note of the thawing of the frozen party systems
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have pointed to the rise of ‘New Politics’ issues of the right and the left as
the major source of change (Betz, 1993; Kitschelt, 1997). Many such
explanations of this change rely on Inglehart’s (1971, 1990) conception of
a ‘post-materialist’ culture becoming dominant among the generation
coming of age in the prosperous times following World War II. However,
the alleged effect of this new dimension has not been uniform across the
advanced industrial democracies; countries with similar electoral laws and
cleavage structures vary in the extent to which these forces have been
observed (see Dalton, 1988). Similarly, even when admitting change in the
vote shares received by parties and the emergence of new parties, some
scholars still question whether these changes represent a fundamental shift
in the party system. For example, Kitschelt (1997) notes that, despite the
collapse of the Italian party system in 1994 and the switch from a list-PR
system to MMP representation, the initial distributions of power in Italy
were not remarkably different in terms of the cleavages represented from
those preceding them. Similarly, Mair (1997) underscores that instances of
inter-area volatility – shifts across party families – are much less common
and muted, and he cautions against placing too much emphasis on more
typical intra-area volatility.
Evaluating the Devolved Party Systems of
the United Kingdom
A review of the literature on the formation and change in party systems
shows disagreement on the causes of formation and at least some un-
certainty concerning the forces of change. All existing research concentrates
on either the national level or the effects of the electoral system at the district
level, however, and devolution in the UK allows us to examine several new
aspects concerning party systems and prompts several questions. First, do
the party systems in the devolved assemblies simply mirror those for each
of the regions as subunits of the already mobilized system of the UK?
Second, are differences between the UK and sub-national party systems the
result of underlying cleavage structures, the distinct electoral laws employed
for devolved elections or the emergence of new cleavages such as post-
materialism? Third, what, if any, effects have party system characteristics
had on government formation in the devolved systems? Finally, what effect
has the context of devolution had on the political parties themselves?
Following Pedersen’s (1979) template, we examine three levels of party
system analysis: the electoral level, the parliament and government level and
the party organization level, with most of our emphasis on the first two
issues. To evaluate the changes in party systems from the UK level to the
sub-national level, we examine the results of the 1992, 1997 and 2001
elections to the House of Commons from the Scottish, Welsh and Northern
Irish subunits (i.e. isolating the election results for those regions). These
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results are then compared to those from the 1998 National Assembly
election in Northern Ireland and elections to the National Assembly for
Wales and the Scottish Parliament held in 1999 as well as the 2003 devolved
elections in all three.
Turning to the electoral level, Table 1 compares the election results from
the 1992–2001 UK elections to the initial elections held for the devolved
assemblies. From the information contained in this table, it is clear that the
elections to the devolved institutions resulted in larger party systems with
vote and seat shares more evenly distributed. In both Scotland and Northern
Ireland, additional parties received representation, and in all three systems
the results were much more balanced in terms of the seat percentage
awarded, as the level of disproportionality was reduced markedly (creating
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Table 1. Comparing disproportionality in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
under first-past-the-post Westminster elections and devolved assemblies
Averages, 1992, 1997
and 2001 UK elections Devolved elections
Vote% Seat% Diff. Vote% Seat% Diff. Vote% Seat% Diff.
Scotland 1999 2003
Labour 42.8 74.6 +31.8 33.6 43.4 +9.8 29.3 38.8 +9.5
SNP 21.2 6.5 –14.7 27.3 27.1 –0.2 20.9 20.9 0.0
Conservative 19.6 5.6 –14.0 15.4 14.0 –1.4 15.5 14.0 –1.5
Lib-Dem 14.1 13.4 –0.7 12.4 13.2 +0.8 11.8 13.2 +1.4
Green – – – 3.6 0.8 –2.8 6.7 5.4 –1.3
Scot. Socialist – – – 2.0 0.8 –1.2 6.9 4.7 –2.2
Wales 1999 2003
Labour 50.9 80.4 +29.5 35.5 46.7 +11.2 36.6 50.0 +13.4
Conservative 23.1 5.3 –17.8 16.5 15.0 –1.5 19.2 18.3 –0.9
Plaid Cymru 10.9 10.2 –0.7 30.6 28.8 –1.8 19.7 20.0 +0.8
Lib-Dem 12.9 4.2 –8.7 12.5 10.0 –2.5 12.7 10.0 –2.7
Northern Ireland 1998 2003
UUP 31.3 47.3 +16.0 21.1 25.9 +4.8 22.7 25.0 +2.3
SDLP 22.9 19.0 –3.9 22.0 22.2 +0.2 17.0 16.7 –0.3
DUP 16.4 18.8 +2.4 18.0 18.5 +0.5 25.7 27.8 +2.1
Sinn Fein 15.9 11.1 –4.8 17.7 16.7 –1.0 23.5 22.2 –1.3
AP – – – 6.5 5.6 –0.9 3.7 5.6 +1.9
United Kingdom 1992 1997 2001
Labour 34.4 40.0 +5.6 43.3 63.6 +20.3 40.7 62.7 +22.0
Conservative 41.9 49.6 +7.7 30.6 25.0 –5.6 31.7 25.2 –6.5
Lib-Dem 17.8 3.0 –14.8 16.7 7.0 –9.7 18.3 7.9 –10.4
SNP 1.9 0.5 –1.4 2.0 0.9 –1.1 1.8 0.8 –1.0
UUP 0.8 1.4 +0.6 0.8 1.5 +0.7 0.8 0.9 +0.1
DUP 0.3 0.5 +0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.8 +0.1
Sinn Fein – – – 0.4 0.3 –0.1 0.7 0.6 –0.1
Plaid Cymru 0.5 0.6 +0.1 0.5 0.6 +0.1 0.7 0.6 –0.1
SDLP 0.5 0.6 +0.1 0.6 0.5 –0.1 0.6 0.5 –0.1
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more fractionalized systems at both the elective and parliamentary levels)
as a result of the implementation of PR in the devolved settings.
While established parties still commanded most of the votes and seats in
the devolved elections, the relative strength of the parties shifted a great
deal. In both Scotland and Wales the Labour Party’s dominant position in
UK elections was eroded. Though Labour remained the largest party under
devolution, it no longer commanded over three-quarters of the seats and in
fact was unable to gain a majority of the seats in either of the first two
devolved elections in Scotland and Wales. The results in Northern Ireland
show that in both UK and devolved elections, the party system in Northern
Ireland is quite distinct from the rest of the UK. While Scotland and Wales
both have strong nationalist parties in the Scottish National Party (SNP)
and Plaid Cymru (PC), both systems have the ‘traditional’ UK parties:
Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats. By contrast, in Northern
Ireland none of these parties even contest elections – a subject we discuss
in more detail below.
Although useful, these aggregate data do not provide an adequate test for
the disputes outlined above. In Table 2, more refined measures of party
system characteristics are presented. Based on these data, it is obvious that
devolution is associated with more effective political parties, both at the
elective (votes) and parliamentary (seats) levels.2 In fact, the increase in both
of these numbers is striking. The effective number of electoral parties
provides a glimpse into the ‘psychological’ influence of electoral laws – in
other words, the strategic behavior by voters to avoid wasting votes on
parties that will not receive representation in parliament. It is clear from
these results that voters in the devolved elections understood that the
prospect of a wasted vote was less likely under the PR systems used in
devolved elections. As a result of this increased distribution of seats at the
level of the electorate and the lower mechanical reductions in vote to seat
translations, the party systems in the devolved assemblies more than
doubled (on average) from the plurality elections for the House of
Commons.3
Hence, the party systems in all three devolved settings diverged from the
British norm of two-party or two-and-a-half-party politics, and, particularly
in Scotland and Wales, diverged from national election results within the
same region. The effective number of parliamentary parties dramatically
increased in all three contexts and in none of the three did a single party
obtain a majority of the assembly seats – a sharp contrast to the ‘manufac-
tured majorities’ that typify elections to the House of Commons. In
addition, it is interesting to note the uniform pattern of increase in both
elective and parliamentary parties across the three cases – while the effec-
tive number of parties increases across the board, Wales still has the fewest
number of parties, Northern Ireland the greatest.
Based on these findings, we can safely conclude that the devolved party
systems all fit into the multiparty category. While this may be a result of the
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change in electoral rules, and hence could lend support to the argument that
electoral rules shape party systems, one could also argue that devolution
has simply changed the context and hence politicized cleavages that were
previously subsumed in the broader context of British politics. These
cleavages are akin to E. E. Schattschneider’s (1960: Ch. 4) subordinate
conflicts that are marginalized in the ‘conflict of conflicts’. In the devolved
context, these conflicts lose their subordinate status and the result of this
increased saliency for regional matters leads to an increase in the number
of political parties.
Fortunately, the adoption of MMP representation in Scotland and Wales
allows us to evaluate at least part of this controversy.4 Under the MMP
arrangements, seats are divided into single-member constituencies (73 of the
129 seats in the Scottish Parliament and 40 of the 60 seats in the National
Assembly for Wales) and party list seats. Voters cast two votes: one for a
constituent representative and one for a party list. Hence, the system
incorporates plurality aspects and proportional elements (the list seats are
used to ‘top up’ or compensate for disproportionalities resulting from the
single-member districts). By comparing the single-member plurality districts
in the devolved elections with the results from House of Commons elections,
we can determine whether it is the mechanics of the electoral system or the
emergence of previously marginalized cleavages that is responsible for the
increased number of parties. If electoral rules are driving the increase, we
would expect the single-member constituencies in the devolved systems to
yield roughly the same results as those for UK elections; if cleavages are
responsible for the increased number of parties, we would expect to see
evidence of this in the results from the devolved single-member districts.
Table 3 displays the effective number of parties resulting from the single-
member districts of the devolved elections and the effective number of
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Table 2. Party system characteristics in the United Kingdom: devolved versus UK
elections
Effective no. of elective parties Increase UK
to devolved
UK elections (1992, 1997 and 2001) Devolved
1999 2003 Avg.
Scotland 3.44 4.55 5.66 5.11 48.5%
Wales 2.91 3.77 4.43 4.10 40.0%
Northern Ireland 4.48 6.00 4.92 5.46 21.9%
Mean 3.61 4.77 5.00 4.89 35.5%
Effective no. of parliamentary parties
Scotland 1.72 3.33 4.24 3.79 120.3%
Wales 1.45 3.02 3.00 3.01 107.6%
Northern Ireland 2.65 5.40 4.54 4.97 87.5%
Mean 1.94 3.92 3.93 3.92 102.1%
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parties under the UK system. While in both cases the effective number of
parliamentary parties increased, the increase was negligible in Scotland but
more substantial in Wales. This could indicate that at least in Wales the
cleavage pattern could have pushed up the number of parties. It is interest-
ing to note that despite the increases in both Scotland and Wales, both
contexts are two-party systems when the single-member constituency seats
are isolated. Hence, they conform to Duverger’s Law. In addition, the
second part of Table 3 shows that the single-member constituency seats yield
much smaller numbers of political parties than the overall outcome. When
the PR list seats are included, the total number of effective parliamentary
parties increases by over 88 percent in Scotland and over 64 percent in
Wales. Clearly, the limited changes between the devolved and national
results in the single-member districts indicate that there is a strong relation-
ship between the electoral laws and the number of parties in the party
system.
Although there is strong evidence for the role of electoral laws in shaping
the party systems of the devolved areas, it is reasonable to assume that
the change in venue – from the national to the sub-national level – also
influenced the party systems. For example, while in Wales the Conservatives
tend to run second to Labour in UK elections, the Welsh National Party –
Plaid Cymru – has emerged as the second party under devolution, leaving
the Tories a distant third. Hence, the move from the national to the sub-
national level seemed to increase the importance of the issues of the nation-
alist parties, as in both Scotland and Wales these parties headed the
opposition. To evaluate the impact of the change in venue on the party
systems, we now turn to more qualitative evidence.
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Table 3. Electoral rules vs. cleavages: comparing the single-member districts in
MMP to UK election results in Scotland and Wales
Effective no. of parliamentary parties – comparison with UK elections
MMP
Single-member
————————————– UK elections Change
1999 2003 Avg. 1992–2001 dev. to UK
Scotland 1.77 2.24 2.01 1.72 +16.9%
Wales 1.95 1.71 1.83 1.45 +26.2%
Effective no. of parliamentary parties – comparison with overall devolved outcomes
MMP Total
Single-member devolved Diff.
Scotland 2.01 3.79 +88.6%
Wales 1.83 3.01 +64.5%
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Cleavages and Party Systems at the Sub-national Level
The party systems of the three sub-national entities in the UK are all distinct
from one another and from that at the national level. At the national level,
the primary conflict is socio-economic, with the Labour Party representing
more of the urban working class, while the Conservatives are associated
with rural and more upper-class issues. The two parties also have divergent
positions on issues such as the UK’s role in the European Union, but the
predominant issue tends to be class (Butler, 1996). By contrast, in each of
the devolved regions there are issues that, because they represent a small
proportion of the UK’s population, tend to be ignored at the national level.
In fact, the distinct natures of each of the devolved regions were at the heart
of the rationale for establishing sub-national governance. Let us now turn
to an analysis of the three systems individually.
Northern Ireland
Table 1 shows how the party system in Northern Ireland is distinct from
any other part of the UK. Owing to the partition of Ireland in 1921, the six
counties of Ulster where Unionists (primarily Protestants) wished to remain
part of the UK were granted Home Rule but remained within the UK. Under
Home Rule, powers were devolved to a parliament eventually located in
Stormont, giving Northern Ireland a level of self-rule. This initial experi-
ment in devolution ultimately proved disastrous in Northern Ireland, in part
because the majoritarian nature of the institutions excluded Catholics and
ensured Protestant dominance (Bohrer, 2001). The party system that
emerged centered principally along sectarian grounds and the proper
position for the province – the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP) are predominantly Protestant and wish to remain
within the UK, while Sinn Fein (SF) and the Social Democratic and Labour
Party (SDLP) are predominantly Catholic and seek, to different degrees, a
unified Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement which provides for the
Northern Ireland Assembly has also played into the cleavage structure:
the UUP, SDLP and Alliance Party (AP) all support the continuation of the
agreement; Sinn Fein is supportive of the agreement, but its ties to the
Provisional IRA cause some consternation about how genuine and complete
this support is. Finally, the DUP seeks a complete overhaul of the peace
agreement.
Class is also a factor in Northern Ireland’s political spectrum (and
conflict), with the DUP and Sinn Fein drawing support from the lower socio-
economic strata, but this issue is so intertwined with the religious loyalist–
separatist dimension that it is essentially impossible to separate them. In
effect, Northern Ireland represents a classic case of reinforcing cleavages.
Given the depth of the differences and the open conflict that has character-
ized ‘The Troubles’, it is not surprising that this system is the most
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fractionalized of the three devolved bodies. Table 4 displays several relevant
party system characteristics for Northern Ireland, with a comparison of the
1992, 1997 and 2001 UK elections in the region for comparison. What is
striking about the results is that in contrast to the previous experience with
Home Rule (1921–1972) the dominance of the UUP was ended with the
move to a devolved institution.
Taken with the results contained in Table 1, it is clear that local interests
are of primary concern in Northern Ireland regardless of the electoral
context. Also noteworthy, however, is the fact that since the initial elections
to the Northern Ireland Assembly the distribution of power within both the
Unionist and Nationalist communities has shifted to the more extreme
parties (the DUP and Sinn Fein, respectively). Moreover, this shift has
filtered into the national elections as both the DUP and Sinn Fein made
substantial gains in the 2001 UK elections.
Scotland and Wales
Politics in Scotland has been referred to as ‘British with a difference’
(McAllister and Rose, 1984: 136), but important variations do exist
between Scotland and Westminster (Brown et al., 1999). One minor, but
symbolically important, difference is the names of the parties. For example,
the Conservative Party is the ‘Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party’.
This nominal change intimates the most important dimension that is present
at the Scottish level but relatively mild at the national level: independence.
Among the national parties – Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats
– there are differences on this issue. The official Conservative Party stance
was against devolution, though it now accepts this as a fait accompli
(Interview with MSP and Conservative and Unionist Parliamentary Leader
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Table 4. Comparing party system characteristics in Northern Ireland, 1992–2001
Election year
National Devolved
Party system characteristics 1992 1997 2001 1998 2003
Fractionalization (votes) 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.83 0.80
Fractionalization (seats) 0.63 0.33 0.73 0.81 0.78
Effective parties (votes) 4.7 4.23 4.54 6.0 4.92
Effective parties (seats) 2.71 1.49 3.76 5.4 4.54
Largest bonus
(%seats – %votes) +18.4 +22.9 +6.6 +4.6 +2.3
Beneficiary UUP UUP UUP UUP UUP
Largest penalty
(%seats – %votes) –9.97 –7.45 –4.3 –1.1 –1.3
Penalized Sinn Fein SDLP SDLP SDLP Sinn Fein
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David McLetchie, June 2000). The Labour Party initiated the move toward
devolution and hence follows a continuation of the present arrangements
as the best path for Scotland, while the Liberal Democrats are in favor of
a federal state. Thus, the three major national parties all have different views
on the issue of independence or autonomy for Scotland. The Scottish
National Party (SNP), Scottish Socialist Party and Greens, all three of which
are in favor of an independent Scotland, oppose these three. Table 5 displays
the party system characteristics of Scotland.
Cleavages in the Welsh party system mirror those in Scotland, with some
relatively minor differences. One such difference concerns the nationalist
Plaid Cymru, which has recently dropped the demand for Welsh indepen-
dence, though it is unclear what level of autonomy the party envisions. Like
the SNP in Scotland, Plaid Cymru emerged from the devolved elections as
the second largest party, and here again the Conservatives slipped to third.
Another similarity with Scotland is the end of dominance for the Labour
Party. While in the 1992–2001 elections to the House of Commons Labour
controlled over 80 percent of the seats from Wales, under the devolved
arrangements Labour was reduced to less than a majority of the seats in the
new assembly. As Table 6 shows, this resulted in increased party system
fragmentation, though primarily at the parliamentary level.
It is interesting to note that in all three devolved systems the main
cleavage that initially emerges is the center–periphery cleavage that Lipset
and Rokkan (1967) associate with the National Revolution. Although all
three of these regions were absorbed by England into the UK long ago, the
presence of large nationalist parties in the devolved settings contrasts not
only with overall UK results, but is also increased from the subunits of
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland for elections to the House of
Commons.
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Table 5. Comparing party system characteristics in Scotland, 1992–2001
Election year
National Devolved
Party system characteristics 1992 1997 2001 1999 2003
Fractionalization (votes) 0.719 0.692 0.716 0.78 0.82
Fractionalization (seats) 0.495 0.369 0.370 0.70 0.76
Effective parties (votes) 3.56 3.25 3.5 4.55 5.66
Effective parties (seats) 1.98 1.58 1.99 3.33 4.24
Largest bonus
(%seats – %votes) +29.06 +32.17 +33.9 +9.8 +9.5
Beneficiary Labour Labour Labour Labour Labour
Largest penalty
(%seats – %votes) –17.30 –17.50 –14.2 –2.8 –2.2
Penalized SNP Cons. Cons. Green Soc.
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Also worthy of note is the lack of influence of post-materialism in any of
the initial elections to the devolved bodies. While Robin Harper’s election
to the Scottish Parliament made him the first Green elected to any office
above the local level, he was the lone representative of such a cleavage at
the national or sub-national level in the UK. However, in 2003 the Scottish
Greens were much more successful, moving from one to seven seats. Still,
other issues dwarfed this ‘New Politics’ cleavage. In historical terms, the
devolution of authority to sub-national units has given new life to cleavages
associated with the oldest revolution, while the most recent ‘culture shift’
initially played a very marginal role in shaping the devolved party systems.5
To review, both electoral laws and cleavage structures have been import-
ant in shaping the devolved party systems. The implementation of PR
electoral laws resulted in multiparty systems ranging from three to five
effective parliamentary parties, all in contrast to that found at the UK level.
Moreover, devolution created space (which was accommodated by more
permissive electoral laws) for the center–periphery cleavage to re-emerge on
the issue of the extent of autonomy desirable for each region (or, in the case
of Northern Ireland, to which nation-state the province should properly be
attached). As a result of this confluence of factors, the party systems in the
devolved areas are more complex bargaining environments than those found
at the national level. In addition, the sub-national institutions create new
challenges for the individual political parties, a subject to which we now turn.
Parties in the Devolved Environments
As noted above, Pedersen (1979) points to the level of party organization
as an important issue in party system analysis. With regard to devolution
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Table 6. Comparing party system characteristics in Wales, 1992–2001
Election year
National Devolved
Party system characteristics 1992 1997 2001 1999 2003
Fractionalization (votes) 0.65 0.64 0.68 0.74 0.77
Fractionalization (seats) 0.39 0.27 0.27 0.67 0.67
Effective parties (votes) 2.86 2.75 3.12 3.77 4.43
Effective parties (seats) 1.64 1.36 1.36 3.02 3.00
Largest bonus
(%seats – %votes) +21.6 +30.28 +36.4 +11.2 +13.4
Beneficiary Labour Labour Labour Labour Labour
Largest penalty
(%seats – %votes) –12.8 –19.59 –21.0 –2.5 –2.7
Penalized Cons. Cons. Cons. Lib-Dem Lib-Dem
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in the UK, it would be reasonable to argue that the advent of new insti-
tutions at the sub-national level could create tension within the nationally
based parties – Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats – as the
regional wings of these parties diverge from the national platform. For
example, the Conservatives were dead set against devolution, to the extent
of actively campaigning against it in the referenda preceding the initiation
of the plan. Once these referenda passed, the Tories were in the uncom-
fortable position of contesting seats for an institution they had fought
against. Similarly, as region-specific issues conflict with those at the national
level, disagreement becomes more likely.
To test this hypothesis, we rely on survey data gathered as part of a larger
project. These surveys resulted in 75 responses from Members of the
Scottish Parliament (MSPs) and 31 Members of the National Assembly for
Wales (AMs) during 2000.6 We asked respondents whether they felt that
devolution had increased, decreased or had no effect on tension within the
party. The combined results from this question are displayed in Table 7. The
results show that nearly half of all Welsh AMs and over 40 percent of MSPs
felt that devolution was associated with higher levels of tension within their
party, while comparatively few felt that devolution had decreased tension
within the party.
Table 8 breaks these results down by party and shows that in nearly all
cases at least a plurality from each party associated devolution with
increased party tension. The exceptions are the nationalist Plaid Cymru in
Wales and the Scottish Conservatives. Although the small number of
respondents necessitates caution, it is interesting to note that both Labour
and the Liberal Democrats indicated increased tension. For Labour, this may
result from controlling the House of Commons and being members of the
executive in both Scotland and Wales. The Liberal Democrats’ position is
likely a reflection of being a junior partner in the coalition in place in
Scotland. In addition, the Welsh Liberal Democrats were in the process at
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Table 7. Survey results of MSPs and AMs on the effects of devolution on tension
in party
Has development of a Scottish Parliament/National Assembly led to increased
tension within your party?
Wales Scotland
The National Assembly/ 48.39% 40%
Parliament has increased tension (N = 15) (N = 18)
within the party
The National Assembly/ 38.71% 42.2%
Parliament has had no effect on (N = 12) (N = 19)
party tension
The National Assembly/ 12.90% 17.78%
Parliament has decreased tension (N = 4) (N = 8)
within the party
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the time of the survey (fall 2000) of joining Welsh Labour in coalition.
Given that the last peacetime coalition in Britain occurred in the era of
Lloyd-George, it is not surprising that this unfamiliar setting could cause
tension.
Since these surveys were conducted one year after the initiation of
devolved institutions in Wales and Scotland, they are limited in their appli-
cation. Yet it is safe to conclude that at least initially devolution led to some-
thing of an increase in tension within political parties. Whether this will
subside or increase is an open question, but these results also lead us to link
the tension to the increased complexity of the party systems and in part to
a divergence in how the sub-national assemblies are governed.
Parties and Governments in the Devolved Settings
As noted above, the devolved systems all diverged considerably from the
British system in the area of government formation. Whereas single-party,
majority government is the rule in the UK, in none of the three devolved
systems did the election results allow this possibility. The increased number
of political parties combined with the distribution of seats left parties with
two options: govern alone as a minority government or form a coalition to
obtain a majority. Interestingly, the three devolved systems initially followed
different patterns of government formation.
Although diverse, a general principle of coalition theory is that parties
will seek to minimize the distribution of power by creating bare minimum-
winning options (for a review of coalition theory, see Lijphart, 1999). In
Scotland, this was the course pursued by the Labour Party (the largest party)
as it joined with the Liberal Democrats to form a minimum-winning
coalition government. Labour also emerged as the largest party in Wales,
but initially chose to form a minority government. In the fall of 2000,
however, Labour and the Liberal Democrats mimicked the Scottish situation
and joined in a minimum-winning coalition. In both of these situations the
coalitions were not only minimum-winning, but also, in terms of policy
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Table 8. Survey results of MSPs and AMs on the effects of devolution on tension
in party – by party
W.Lab S.Lab PC W.LD S.LD W.Con S.Con
Increased 50% 46.15% 33.33% 60% 66.67% 75% 14.29%
(N = 5) (N = 12) (N = 4) (N = 3) (N = 4) (N = 3) (N = 2)
No effect 40% 38.46% 41.67% 40% 33.33% 25% 50%
(N = 4) (N = 10) (N = 5) (N = 2) (N = 2) (N = 1) (N = 7)
Decreased 10% 15.38% 25% 0% 0% 0% 28.57%
(N = 1) (N = 4) (N = 3) (N = 0) (N = 0) (N = 0) (N = 4)
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positions, connected and of minimal range as the two parties are both
relatively centrist. Under the Good Friday Agreement, the four main parties
in Northern Ireland – two representing the Unionist position and two
representing the Republican position – formed an oversized coalition
government.
Additionally, nationalist parties emerged as the strongest members of the
opposition in both Scotland and Wales. In the initial elections, the Welsh
National Party, Plaid Cymru, received nearly 29 percent of the seats in the
National Assembly, while the Scottish National Party (SNP) took 27 percent
of the seats in parliament. As the largest non-executive parties, the SNP and
Plaid Cymru formed the official opposition parties and set up shadow
cabinets. Both nationalist parties retained their status in the second devolved
elections, though both the SNP and, especially, Plaid Cymru, suffered losses
of vote and seat shares in 2003.
Another difference between the devolved systems and the UK was
displayed on the issue of the Poindings and Warrants bill in the Scottish
Parliament. This bill, introduced by Scottish Socialist Tommy Sheridan as a
private member’s bill, called for an end to the practice of seizing and
auctioning individuals’ personal property to pay off debts. The Scottish
Executive opposed the bill; however, Labour MSPs strongly supported it
and voted en masse for its passage. This example diverges sharply from the
practice of party politics in the House of Commons in two ways: first,
private members’ bills are uncommon at the UK level – almost all legislation
emanates from the cabinet; second, anything opposed by the British cabinet
has very little chance of passage (particularly if it originates from the oppo-
sition). As Alex Neil, an SNP member of both the Scottish Parliament and
the House of Commons, put it ‘something like that would never happen in
Commons’ (Interview conducted with Alex Neil, June 2000). Thus, the
functioning of parties in Scotland varies a great deal from the British norm.
Hence, the increased complexity of the party systems in the devolved
systems and the increased number of political parties led to coalition
governments initially in two of the three systems, though the Welsh minority
government followed suit in 2000. As a result, along with a general desire
for more consensual arrangements, the executives do not have the same
control over the assemblies, at least initially.
Conclusions
The devolution of authority to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
marked a fundamental shift in government in the UK. Not only was power
decentralized, but also the sub-national bodies varied considerably from the
UK level. In all three levels specified by Pedersen (1979) – the electoral,
parties and governments and parties as organization – differences from the
UK were observed.
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Based on the initial elections under devolution, several important patterns
emerge with regard to the party systems in the devolved settings. First, the
implementation of PR has led to larger party systems in the devolved insti-
tutions, both at the elective and parliamentary levels. While some of the
differences between national and sub-national party systems may be due to
the change in venue and different cleavage structures (e.g. the emergence of
strong nationalist parties in both Scotland and Wales), there is a distinct,
independent effect of the electoral rules. Additionally, the center–periphery
cleavage has emerged in the devolved settings as more relevant than at the
UK level. Even in Northern Ireland, where the republican–unionist divide
already dominated, the cleavage has added importance as the pro- and anti-
agreement issues have divided parties in the system. Finally, the different
contexts and electoral rules at the sub-national level have resulted in more
complex, multiparty environments. Government formation diverges in all
three devolved settings from the British norm of single-party majority
government.
In closing, it is important to note that these results are preliminary – at
the time of this writing less than five years have passed since the opening of
the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly – yet the distinctions from the
national level are pronounced. Moreover, the 2003 devolved elections
indicate that these differences are more than transitory.
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1 Others found empirical support for the frozen party thesis as well (see Rose and
Urwin, 1970).
2 The calculation of the effective number of parties was developed by Laakso and
Taagepera (1979) and is simply as follows (effective number of elective parties)
Ev = 1/Σvi2, where vi is the vote share gained by each party in a given election. For
the effective number of parliamentary parties, the calculation is the same except
that seat shares for each party are substituted for vote shares.
3 For a more thorough analysis of the psychological and mechanical effects of the
electoral laws in the devolved systems, see Bohrer and Krutz (forthcoming).
4 In the UK, this system is referred to as the Additional Member System (AMS), but
we use the more general term of MMP. Similar systems are in place in Germany,
Italy, New Zealand and Hungary.
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5 This is not to say that post-materialist cleavages are not influential in any way in
the devolved settings, but rather that Green parties were largely absent in the
initial elections. In Scotland, the SNP has a fairly active environmental agenda,
and the prevalence of the center–periphery cleavage most likely masks the post-
materialist dimension.
6 Our overall response rate was 58.1 percent for the Scottish Parliament sample and
51.7 percent for the Welsh Assembly. The Scottish sample is reduced in this case,
as the question was not asked of SNP members or the Green MSP.
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Data Sources
United Kingdom and Devolved Elections:
BBC Online: www.bbc.co.uk
www.alba.org.uk
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